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Many taxa of freshwater and marine Zooplankton are present in the upper 
waters only at night. Düring or around sunrise they swim long distances down-
ward, and at dusk they ascend again. Debate continues about the ultimate and 
proximate causes of this widespread behavior. The study of phototactic responses 
(Siebeck 1960; Ringelberg 1964) has shown that changes in relative light intensity 
may trigger diel vertical migration. Leaving the warm and food-rich surface 
waters may be disadvantageous to the animals because growth and reproduction 
are affected by food intake whereas egg developmental time is inversely related to 
temperature. Several hypotheses of the mechanisms counterbalancing this possi-
ble fitness disadvantage have been proposed. 
The occurrence and the intensity of vertical migration vary between lakes and 
within and between species. The Situation in Lake Constance (West Germany, 
Austria, and Switzerland) is especially interesting, since morphologically similar, 
coexisting congeneric species show contrasting patterns of vertical migration. 
One species, D a p h n i a h y a l i n a , migrates; the other, D . g a l e a t a , does not (Stich 
and Lampert 1981; Geller 1986). Both this discovery and further experimental 
studies (Stich and Lampert 1984) have cast doubt on arguments based solely on 
metabolic advantages or increased efficiency in the utilization of resources 
(McLaren 1963, 1974; Kerfoot 1970; Enright 1977; Enright and Honegger 1977). In 
addition, damage from direct solar radiation (Huntsman 1925; Hairston 1976) is 
unlikely to be of great importance in the evolution of this phenomenon. Specula-
tions on a starvation-avoidance strategy (Geller 1986) still lack experimental 
confirmation. A more plausible explanation is that migratory behavior is a re-
sponse to predators that hunt by sight (Zaret and Suffern 1976; Wright et al. 1980; 
Stich and Lampert 1981; Ohman et al. 1983; Clark and Levy 1988). Recently, 
Gliwicz (1986) has supported this hypothesis with data demonstrating a gradual 
increase in the amplitude of diel vertical migration correlated with an artificially 
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imposed augmentation of predators. These investigations all suggest that diel 
vertical migration is an adaptive strategy for avoiding predation. 
Weider (1984) has shown that the behavior of diel vertical migration has a strong 
genetic component. We assume that the frequency of phenotypes with different 
migratory behavior influences their relative fitness. Evolutionary game theory 
may aid in the investigation of the conditions under which diel vertical migration is 
an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS; Maynard Smith and Price 1973; Maynard 
Smith 1974, 1982; Thomas 1984). 
ON IWASA'S GAME MODEL FOR ZOOPLANKTON MIGRATION 
To our knowledge, Iwasa (1982) was the first to employ methods of evolution-
ary game theory in explaining vertical migration of Zooplankton. He designed a 
game between a predator (fish) and prey (herbivorous zooplankter) in which two 
types of behavior ("strategies") are considered for both fish and Zooplankton: 
staying in the upper or lower layer of water. From this habitat-selection game he 
derived several interesting features about the distributions of both species be-
tween the water layers. The main results of the game appear in good agreement 
with empirical findings, but its theoretical grounds seem problematic. 
In Iwasa's model, the fitness of one species is determined solely by the behavior 
of the other species. For example, fish fitness is assumed to depend on Zooplank-
ton availability in either layer but is not affected by the behavior of conspecifics. 
Similarly, the payoffs—in terms of fitness—for Zooplankton are not influenced by 
the frequencies of Zooplankton strategies. Therefore, the model describes a game 
between populations without self-interaction. A general theorem about "asym-
metrical" games or, likewise, interacting populations states that mixed equilibria 
(different strategies coexist in one or both populations) cannot be evolutionarily 
stable in the absence of self-interaction (Pohley and Thomas 1979; Selten 1980; 
Schuster and Sigmund 1981). This holds at least for linear models like Iwasa's; 
some of his most interesting Statements are thus based on an equilibrium that is 
not evolutionarily stable. In particular, this game model does not provide a valid 
explanation for a Situation in which fish and Zooplankton migrate between two 
layers in a way that maintains fixed equilibrium portions of fish and Zooplankton in 
each layer. 
The prerequisite for self-interaction for mixed evolutionarily stable equilibria is 
intuitively evident from the following argument. To determine whether an equilib-
rium is evolutionarily stable, one must ask what would happen if the equilibrium 
were perturbed, for example, if by chance zooplankters of a given Strategie type 
should increase above equilibrium. The condition of evolutionary stability de-
mands that, in this case, the deviation should be counterbalanced; that is, an 
excess of this Strategie type should be "punished" by a reduetion in the payoff 
associated with this strategy. In Iwasa's habitat-selection game, however, the 
payoff terms for Zooplankton strategies depend o n l y on the frequencies of fish in 
the corresponding layer. Consequently, at an equilibrium point for fish strategies, 
both Zooplankton strategies fare equally well, whatever their frequencies are, and 
an excess of one Strategie type would not lower its fitness. Moreover, if the 
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distribution of fish strategies deviates from its equilibrium, then the payoffs for the 
Zooplankton strategies are again dependent only on the frequencies of fish strate-
gies but independent of the actual proportions of Zooplankton strategies. That is, 
if one Zooplankton strategy is inferior at a certain proportion of fish strategies, 
then this strategy would be "punished," regardless of whether its frequency is 
below or above equilibrium. In particular, if it were below its equilibrium value, it 
would further decrease rather than re-approach the Zooplankton equilibrium. The 
corresponding argument holds for fish strategies. 
It may be objected that, if the Zooplankton frequencies were to drift away from 
their equilibrium values as described above, the payoff for fish strategies would 
change. Thus, it could be imagined that the fish frequencies may be driven into a 
ränge where Zooplankton strategies might recover their equilibrium. At this point, 
however, intuitive arguments do not lead us any further, and we have to rely on a 
mathematical treatment of the problem, which states that, in this case, strategy 
coexistence cannot be evolutionarily stable. In fact, a dynamic Simulation for such 
a model shows that deviations from the equilibrium distribution are not compen-
sated for (see Schuster and Sigmund 1981). 
In this paper, we present a model that includes both interaction with a predator 
a n d self-interaction. For convenience, the model will be formulated for Zooplank-
ton only. This is because, in agreement with the empirical findings, we assume 
that vertical migration indeed protects the Zooplankton from fish predation in 
Upper waters; hence, it will be assumed that fish do not migrate vertically. 
Predation protection in lower waters may occur either because Zooplankton in 
deeper water layers are invisible to fish that forage by sight or because the oxygen 
depletion becomes intolerable to planktivorous fish. Fish species that have 
learned to follow the vertical migration of Zooplankton are not considered explic-
itly in our model and are treated like other (strategy-dependent) mortality factors. 
CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF THE MODEL 
We attempt to explain diel vertical migration by a game-theoretical approach 
that concentrates on the Zooplankton population, that is, its metabolic, reproduc-
tive, and feeding conditions, and its mortality caused by predation. We assume 
that vertical migration is a behavioral response to various selective forces and 
physiological constraints. Food intake, metabolic costs, reproduction, and risk of 
predation depend on the strategy chosen. Because most planktivorous fish hunt 
by sight, light conditions strongly influence the predation mortality of Zooplank-
ton. The risk of fish predation is therefore highest during daytime in the upper 
water layers. The density of edible algae may be altered by Zooplankton in that 
vertical migration reduces grazing pressure on the algae (Lampert and Taylor 
1985). In addition, migrating animals experience a lower average temperature than 
nonmigrating ones; this increases the egg developmental time but may also reduce 
metabolic costs. 
To study the combined effect of these variables and their relations we simply 
consider two genetically determined ethotypes, namely, migrating and nonmigrat-
ing zooplankters, which may, in principle, both occur in a Zooplankton popula-
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TABLE 1 
COMPARISON OF ZOOPLANKTON STRATEGIES 
Water 
Layer Day Night 
Upper s, stationary strategy s, stationary strategy 
v, migrating strategy 
high food high food 
high temperature high temperature 
accelerated development accelerated development 
predation risk from fish no predation risk from fish 
Lower v, migrating strategy 
low food (no Zooplankton) 
low temperature 
retarded development 
no predation risk from fish 
tion. We believe that the basic results derived from this simplifying approach 
would not differ qualitatively if a more finely grained distinction had been made, 
although this finer distinction of intermediate ethotypes might be necessary for a 
comparison with data from real populations. These behavioral types are imple-
mented as "strategies" in a two-strategy model. It is not the number of strategies 
that makes a valid model. It is only economic to implement model complexity 
where it is needed: we deal with few strategies but spend more effort on detailed 
interaction and on the payoff consequences of other determinants. We also 
consider two distinct water layers and assume that nonmigrating animals always 
stay in the upper layer but migrating animals are in the lower layer during the 
daytime and in the upper layer at night (see table 1). Here, "daytime" is defined as 
a period during which fish forage by sight in the upper layer, whereas at night 
there is relatively little or no fish predation. We explicitly implemented the 
mortality caused by daytime fish predation in the upper layer. Aside from fish 
predation, we consider only global components of strategy-dependent mortality, 
for example, different rates of juvenile and adult mortality caused by invertebrate 
predators. The interaction of Zooplankton with its algal food is calculated in some 
detail. Like vertical migration, algal growth also exhibits a diurnal cycle. We 
restrict the time of algal growth to the daytime (as defined for the Zooplankton). 
Furthermore, we assume that available food in the lower layer is, at most, only 
enough to meet metabolic requirements. We calculate the success, or payoffs, for 
different strategies with respect to the following additional determinants (see table 
2): actual algal density, grazing rate, abundance of Zooplankton, day length, 
intensity and frequency dependence of fish predation, conversion of ingested food 
to reproductive Output (mortality besides fish predation included), and the depen-
dence of egg developmental time on water temperature. 
Interaction within a Zooplankton population does not consist of individual 
encounters as in simple games but is, rather, "against the field" (Maynard Smith 
1982; Pohley and Thomas 1983). Interaction consists mainly of food competition 
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T A B L E 2 
MODEL PARAMETERS AND SUBSCRIPTS 
Subscript 
d during the day 
n during the night 
v v strategy: diel vertical migration 
s s strategy: stationary, no migration 
Parameter 
a food uptake 
ad during the day (s strategy only) 
an during the night (v and s strategies) 
A algal density 
A i i m algal density above which the food uptake is independent of algal density (incip-
ient limiting level) 
D population density of Zooplankton feeding in the upper water layer 
N total population density of Zooplankton 
p predation risk from fish (and other optically oriented predators) 
r p potential growth rate of algae (in the absence of feeding Zooplankton) 
S (5.,.) relative payoffs measured in successful reproductive Output (but corrected for 
fitness contributions due to different intergenerational periods) 
Tn length of night (in parts of 24 h) 
w slow-breeding correction factor 
x (*s, xv) relative part of a strategy present in the total population 
ß (ß s . ßv) conversion factor of food uptake to successful reproductive Output (mortalities 
other than fish predation taken into account) 
y maximal grazing rate of Zooplankton 
A 5 5 S - S V , payoff difference between nonmigrating and migrating Zooplankton 
T (TV, TS) egg developmental time 
in different layers and a modulation of fish predation, both dependent on the 
frequencies of the Zooplankton ethotypes present. We measure the payoffs of the 
two strategies relative to each other with respect to a time period of 24 h on a scale 
that represents fitness in terms of successful reproductive Output equivalent to 
intrinsic growth rates. 
In principle, game-theoretical analysis may reveal evolutionary stability in any 
of the following situations: no migration at all, vertical migration of the whole 
population, and a mixture of migrating and nonmigrating individuals within a 
population (i.e., neither of the strategies is an evolutionarily stable strategy [ESS] 
on its own). In addition, both the migratory and the stationary strategies may be 
ESS's exclusively, providing the possibility that the whole population may be 
turned to the alternative behavior if occasional fluctuations are strong enough. 
The aim of the model is to evaluate boundary conditions and essential determi-
nants that imply evolutionary stability in any of these situations. The ESS-
theoretical approach has the advantage that general conclusions can be drawn 
without explicit Simulation of complex population dynamics. 
EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY 
We analyze the simple Situation for an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of 
one Zooplankton population with two strategies: diel vertical migration (strategy 
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with subscript v) and no migration (strategy with subscript s for stationary). Let JC V 
and x s denote the (relative) frequencies of v and s types in a population. Since x v 
+ x s = 1, we may use x s as the independent variable to describe the population 
State. The payoffs from either strategy may depend on the population State and are 
thus denoted by 5 s(JC s) and S v(x s), respectively. Accordingly, let 
AS(xs) = Ss(xs) - Sv(;cs) (1) 
denote the difference between the payoffs of the strategies. Originally, an ESS 
could not be invaded by rare mutants once it had become established in the 
population. Assuming a pure, nonmigrating population (i.e., x s = 1), the station-
ary strategy s would be evolutionarily stable if, whenever a few mutants of type v 
reduce x s by a small quantity e from 1 to 1 - €, we would still have 5S(1 - e) > 
5V(1 - e). That is, because selection acts against it, strategy v cannot invade a 
population of s types. The corresponding Interpretation holds for evolutionary 
stability of strategy v. 
A population may achieve a State of evolutionary stability in another way: an 
evolutionarily stable polymorphism, or population State, is characterized by a 
stable balance of selective forces on either type expressed by a payoff equilibrium 
at some frequency i s : 
Ss(xs) = 5 v ( i s ) . (2) 
Stability requires that deviations from this equilibrium frequency result in a 
disadvantage to the type whose frequency is enhanced over its equilibrium value. 
In our case, this condition can be expressed as 
(JC, - Jcs) A5(x s) < 0 (3) 
for JC s close to i s . In generic cases, this simply means that AS (x s ) must have a 
negative slope at Jfs. The formalism for multi-strategy models was described by 
Pohley and Thomas (1983). Hence, we can investigate our model for evolu-
tionarily stable strategies (ESS's, in the sense of evolutionarily stable states; see 
Thomas 1984) by identifying one of the following conditions: 
s is an ESS if AS(x s = 1) > 0; 
v is an ESS if A5(JC s = 0) < 0; (4) 
i s is an ESS if AS(xs = JCs) = 0 and d A S ( J c s ) / d x s < 0. 
This is most easily done by plotting graphs of A5(JC s) versus x s after evaluating the 
strategy-dependent payoff functions Ss and S v . A crucial point for this calculation 
is the food uptake of Zooplankton: the ingested food is an important fitness 
component, and the interaction of Zooplankton with its algal food implies Zoo-
plankton self-interaction modulated by the frequencies of the two strategies. 
ALGAL DENSITY AND FOOD UPTAKE 
According to experimental studies on feeding physiology (McMahon and Rigler 
1965; Lampert 1977), ingestion and assimilation rates increase linearly with food 
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concentration until maximal values are reached at a certain level of food concen-
tration. If food concentrations are increased above this so-called incipient limiting 
level (Fry 1947, cited in McMahon and Rigler 1965), food uptake remains con-
stant. Therefore, the interaction of Zooplankton with its algal food has to be 
modeled differently for low and high food concentrations. 
At low food concentrations we describe the dynamics of algal density (A) by 
formally separating the interaction with the Zooplankton from all other influences. 
We assume that 
d A l d t = r p A - y D A , (5) 
with r p as a "partiar' intrinsic growth rate, which would apply to the algae in the 
absence of the Zooplankton; D is the density of the actual feeding part of the 
Zooplankton population; and 7 is the maximal filtration rate. With these 
definitions, A and D must be normalized such that y D corresponds to an intrinsic 
death rate of the algae caused by the Zooplankton. For our study, it is not 
necessary to consider the long-term behavior of algae, since we are interested 
only in payoff analysis based on a representative time period of 24 hours. (Note 
that 24 hours is also the minimum period that has to be taken into account since 
this period is fundamental to the description of Zooplankton strategies.) With 
equation (5), we implicitly assume that at low concentrations all positive and 
negative effects on algal growth besides Zooplankton grazing can be taken into 
account by a Single variable r p . Thus, r p can hardly be constant over longer time 
periods, but it is the advantage of a local ESS analysis that we do not have to 
consider long-term dynamics. The ingested food per animal (a) in a time interval T 
is obtained by integration over the product of algal density with filtration rate: 
a = f y A W d t . (6) 
Jo 
Let A 0 denote the algal density at sunrise, and Tn < 1 the length of the night (we 
use 24 hours as the time unit so that 1 — Tn gives the daylight fraction). Let N 
denote the total Zooplankton density, and x s the nonmigrating part of the popula-
tion, which implies that D = x s N is the proportion of Zooplankton feeding during 
daylight in the upper layer. Integration of equations (5) and (6) yields the food 
intake per animal during daylight: 
a d = 7A0{exp[(rp - y x s N ) ( l - T„)] - l}/(r p - y x s N ) . (7) 
For simplicity, we assume that only the Zooplankton under consideration are 
feeding on the algae represented by A or that other Zooplankton have distinct food 
niches or are negligible with respect to A . Thus, neglecting metabolic losses of the 
algae, we can approximate rp = 0 at night. Integrating equations (5) and (6) under 
this condition starting from the calculated algal density at sunset, we determine 
the total food intake during the night: 
a n = A 0exp[(r p - y x s N ) ( l - T„)][l - e x p ( - y N T n ) ] / N . (8) 
At high food concentration (at or above the incipient limiting level), the food 
uptake during the day (ad) and night (an) is independent of the actual algal density. 
206 THE AMERICAN NATURALIST 
If the algal density at the incipient limiting level is denoted by A i i m , then a d and a n 
are simply given by 
a d = y A [ i m ( l - Tn) for A > A l i m , (9a) 
a n = yAlimTn for A > A l i m . (9b) 
PAYOFFS 
The relative advantages of the two strategies can be compared without an 
absolute fitness scale. To calculate relative payoffs in terms of successful repro-
ductive Output for a time interval of 24 h, we must convert the food uptake into 
reproduction. For this purpose we use a general, but strategy-dependent, Parame-
ter, ß. Since we do not differentiate age classes, this parameter gives an average 
over a whole subpopulation with the same strategy, and it may also comprise 
other strategy-dependent factors like juvenile mortality and life span. The food-
conversion factor ß mainly reflects energy for metabolism and somatic growth. 
To compare the two strategies, however, it is not sufficient just to count the 
reproductive Output, since fitness also depends on the time span in which this 
Output is released. For example, let us hypothesize that lower metabolic costs 
compensate for the reduced food uptake resulting from migration. Then, migrating 
and nonmigrating Zooplankton would produce an equal number of eggs over a 
certain time period, but they would differ in clutch sizes and time intervals 
between releases of the clutches. This occurs because the egg developmental time 
is inversely related to temperature. As a result, an animal living at a lower average 
temperature waits longer to hatch eggs carried in the brood pouch. The nonmigrat-
ing Zooplankton with the shorter egg developmental time (and also shorter pre-
reproductive period) thereby realizes a higher intrinsic growth rate by its earlier 
release of its off spring (releasing 20 eggs after 10 days results in lower fitness than 
releasing 10 eggs every 5 days). The expected number of descendants per migrat-
ing animal including itself after one intergenerational period is simply 1 + /i, if n is 
the number of eggs produced in one clutch. For fitness comparisons, we must 
calculate the corresponding number for a hypothetical faster-breeding animal that 
releases n off spring in the same time span but distributed over k clutches, such 
that each clutch consists of n l k juveniles. If we assume that off spring reach 
maturity after one of these shorter intergenerational periods, then the expected 
number of descendants for a time interval equivalent to the intergenerational 
period of the slower breeders (k times the intergenerational time of the faster 
breeders) is given by the geometric series 
+ - ( ' • * ) ' • <'»> 
(This result can also easily be derived from the equivalent difference equations.) 
To calculate the strategy-dependent payoffs in terms of reproductive Output, we 
must account for the influence on fitness of the time between two clutches. If the 
payoff for nonmigration is unchanged, we must adjust the payoff for migration 
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according to the different numbers of expected descendants (1 + n against [1 + 
n l k ] k ) by applying the (slower-breeder) correction factor w: 
w = (i + ri)l{\ + n / k ) k . (11) 
Since the migrating animals are not exposed to fish predation, the different 
breeding times associated with the two strategies cannot necessitate an additional 
fitness correction because implications of predation are different. Mortality not 
caused by fish that forage by sight must be considered separately for each strategy 
in ß v and ß s . 
The payoffs for diel vertical migration and no migration are the sum of payoffs 
obtained during the day and night: 
$s = *Ss > n + » S S t C i ; 
(12) 
According to the model assumption, there is no fish predation at night. The 
corresponding payoffs are given by the amount of ingested food, a n , times the 
strategy-specific conversion into reproduction ( ß ) : 
(13) 
5 v,n = ß v t f n W , 
with w from equation (11) as the factor that corrects for the unequal periods of egg 
development, T s and T v , of the strategies s and v. We simplify the Situation by 
assuming that egg developmental time T equals the time between molts and the 
accompanied release of juveniles. By putting k = T V / T s and n = $ v a n i v in equation 
(11), we can calculate w as 
W = (1 + ß v a N T v ) / ( l + ß v * n T s r / T s . (14) 
During daylight, the predation risk diminishes the payoff for nonmigrating animals 
(strategy s). Let p be the probability of being eaten during daytime and a d be the 
food ingested during this time. The payoff from feeding in the surface layer during 
the daylight is then (1 - / ? ) ß s t f d - In case of predation, however, carried eggs and 
the material stored in the ovaries are also lost. The energy stored in these eggs was 
collected during daylight and at night over the time period T s . Since the average 
animal is in the middle of the molting phase, it has invested food for the ovaries 
over a time period of T s / 2 . Therefore, we must subtract the total expected loss, 
that is, 3 / 2 ß S T s ( a n + <zd) weighted by probability p . Thereby, the payoff for non-
migrating animals during daylight is 
Ss,d = 0 - P)ßstfd - 3 / 2 / > ß S T s ( a n + ö d ) . (15) 
Because feeding conditions for migrating animals are poor from sunrise until 
sunset, the corresponding payoff is assumed to be negligible compared to the 
payoff from feeding at night. (In reality, it may even be negative if metabolic costs 
are not balanced by food uptake.) Thus, we can set 
5 v , d = 0. (16) 
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With these payoffs we quantify the fitness difference of nonmigrating and migrat-
ing animals as AS = 5 S - Sv. At low concentrations of algal food (below the 
incipient limiting level) and/or under density-dependent fish predation, the payoff 
functions are nonlinear with respect to the relative frequencies of the two strate-
gies. For that reason, a simple game model with a constant-payoff matrix is not 
applicable (Pohley and Thomas 1983). Instead, we use the total payoff difference 
AS(xs) for the analysis of evolutionary stability according to equation (4). This can 
be done most comprehensively by simple graphical means. 
RESULTS 
We present results on evolutionarily stable strategies and states for high and 
low food concentrations and discuss the influence of the model parameters on the 
favored strategy. The parameter values are estimated from the literature values 
for D a p h n i a h y a l i n a and D . g a l e a t a (e.g., Stich and Lampert 1984; Stich 1985; 
Geller 1986) and therefore represent situations realized in nature. If not stated 
differently, we used the following parameter set: y = 0.55, rp = 0.35, N = 1, p = 
0.1, Tn = 0.4, ß s = 10, ß v = 11, T s = 5, T v = 10, A > A l i m or A = 0.5A l i m . 
H i g h F o o d C o n c e n t r a t i o n s 
Above the incipient limiting level, food uptake is not influenced by the relative 
frequencies of the two strategies; thus, frequency-dependent payoff functions can 
be caused only by fish predation. In the simplest case of high food concentration 
and constant predation pressure, we therefore expect a straight line parallel to the 
*s-axis for the graphical representation of the payoff difference, AS. That is, the 
payoff difference, AS, is independent of frequency; this does not necessarily 
mean, however, that payoffs themselves are independent of frequency. It is the 
differences that matter here. For values of AS above zero, the stationary strategy 
s is evolutionarily stable; below zero, only strategy v (diel vertical migration) can 
be established. In fact, the favored strategy is determined by physiological param-
eters and metabolic requirements of the Zooplankton species, the difference in the 
average temperature perceived according to the two strategies, the length of the 
night phase, and the intensity of the predation pressure, whatever its frequency. 
For example, with increasing fish predation, the advantage of strategy s can be 
reduced drastically (fig. 1), such that at a certain predation pressure (corre-
sponding to the zero line) strategy v becomes an ESS. Similar figures can be 
produced by changing other model parameters. 
Figure 2 illustrates the Situation under the assumption of frequency-dependent 
predation risks. The predation pressure is chosen such that for JC s = 1, when all 
Zooplankton are nonmigrating (stationary), strategy s is favored. Moreover, with 
decreasing JC s , the total amount of prey for the fish is reduced. A negative slope can 
be achieved only if the predation risk per zooplankter increases with Zooplankton 
density. This seems to be quite unrealistic but could, in principle, be caused by 
learning and by highly prey-selective predators. If the predation risk decreases 
with Zooplankton abundance, the advantage of s strategists increases wi th their 
frequency, resulting in a positive slope in the figure. 
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FIG. 1 {left).—The payoff difference A S between strategy s (no vertical migration) and 
strategy v (diel vertical migration) as a function of the relative frequency of strategy s, x s . The 
concentration of algal food is high (A > A U m ) . The predation risk for the Zooplankton, p, is 
taken to be independent of its abundance and varied between 0 and 0.25 in increments of 
0.025. Values of the other model parameters: 7 = 0.55, r = 0.35, N = 1, TD = 0.4, ß s = 10, 
ßv = 11, T s = 5, T v = 10. 
FIG. 2 (right).—Same as figure 1, but with predators' foraging density dependent on 
Zooplankton density. The predation risk at x s = 1 (high prey density) is fixed at p = 0.05 and 
increases or decreases linearly with JCs to values between 0 and 0.25 at x s = 0. 
The intersecting points with equal payoffs for the two strategies, however, are 
unstable equilibria by equation (4): for lower JC s values the advantage of the v 
strategy increases from generation to generation until the whole population partic-
ipates in vertical migration. This means that both strategies are ESS's but exclude 
each other: a mixed population would be driven to a pure s-type or v-type 
population depending on the starting frequencies. Similarly, random fluctuations 
could by chance reverse selection conditions (with respect to frequencies) and 
thus lead to the establishment of the opposite strategy. The condition for a stable 
mixture of strategies (negative slope at AS = 0) can be fulfilled only if, at high 
frequencies of x s , strategy v is superior to strategy s, causing the payoff difference 
AS at x s = 1 in figure 2 to drop below zero. In addition, vertically migrating 
Zooplankton would have to realize a higher payoff than nonmigrating ones at low 
frequencies of x s (or at high frequencies of x v ) . Therefore, at high food concentra-
tions, the model predicts pure strategies and allows stable mixtures of strategies 
only for special cases when the predation risk increases with prey abundance. 
L o w F o o d C o n c e n t r a t i o n s 
Below the incipient limiting level of food concentration, the payoffs depend on 
the relative frequency of strategies, as shown by the calculations of food uptake in 
equations (7) and (8). For reasons of clarity, we discuss only cases of constant 
predation risk. The additional effects of density-dependent predation pressure are 
equivalent to the results given above and would have to be superimposed. To 
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FIG. 3.—Frequency dependence of the payoff difference at low algal densities {A = 
0.5Aiim). The predation risk is fixed at p = 0.11, and the abundance of Zooplankton is 
increased from 0.5 to (unrealistically high values of) 10.5. 
demonstrate what complex payoff functions can result from the interaction of 
Zooplankton with its algal food, figure 3 shows payoff differences for various total 
Zooplankton densities at unrealistic parameter values. Even if rarely realized in 
nature, inherent in the structure of the model are nontrivial results like two 
simultaneous equilibrium points: a stable one at low frequencies of x s , and an 
unstable one at higher values of J C s . In this case, the starting frequency determines 
whether a mixture of strategies or a pure s strategy (nonmigrating) can establish an 
evolutionarily stable State. 
Figure 4 shows the influence of increased predation risk. Without any predation 
risk, we obtain a negative slope because at low frequencies of nonmigrating 
Zooplankton, the algae can grow better during the day; the resulting higher food 
availability during the day gives an additional advantage to s strategists. With 
increasing predation pressure, the slope changes to positive values; therefore, 
enhanced predation risk causes the greatest increases in the relative payoffs for 
migrating Zooplankton if the number of nonmigrating animals is small. This 
change of slope occurs at the critical point of predation intensity where the payoff 
for strategy s becomes negative (in relative terms of the model) but its absolute 
value still increases with food availability. In general, there is always a maximum 
level of predation pressure that may be compensated for by other advantages; 
under still-higher mortality risks, only the strategy of vertical migration can be 
evolutionarily stable. At moderate levels of predation, each strategy can be an 
ESS, but for many (realistic) combinations of model parameters, strategy mix-
tures are also ESS's. Even without any fish predation, stable mixed populations 
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FIG. 4.—Same as figure 1 but at low algal densities (A = 0.5 A H M ) . 
are possible in principle. This outcome requires extreme conditions, however, 
such as short days and high metabolic advantage for migrating animals. 
A Variation in one model parameter can cause a change from a Single stable 
strategy to a stable mixture of strategies or even to the stability of the opposite 
strategy. The more sensitive the model is to such a parameter, the more easily 
may evolutionary stability switch to an alternative. One of the most sensitive 
parameters is egg developmental time. Figure 5 gives such an example where an 
8% Variation in egg developmental time T v , which corresponds to a Variation in the 
average temperature pereeived by v strategists, is sufficient to cause the change 
from one stable strategy over a stable mixture of strategies to the stability of the 
opposite strategy. Therefore, the region of a stable mixture of strategies may be 
sometimes restricted to narrow parameter bands. 
I n f l u e n c e of t h e M o d e l P a r a m e t e r s 
The role of most model parameters on the strategy is intuitively clear and can 
also be derived easily from the formulas for AS. Any increase in ß, the strategy-
dependent conversion factor, raises the chances of its aecompanied strategy, but a 
prolonged egg developmental time favors the opposite strategy. Higher predation 
pressure is always advantageous for strategy v. An improved maximal filtration 
rate increases the fitness of both strategies, but strategy s gains more than strategy 
v. Below the incipient limiting level, the relative payoff for strategy v decreases as 
food concentration increases, but a higher growth rate of the algae can be used 
better by animals that always stay in the upper water layer. High abundance of 
Zooplankton has the opposite effect of high food availability, but at very high 
Zooplankton abundances a frequency-dependent influence may favor the s strat-
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FIG. 5.—Shift in the stable equilibrium of strategy frequencies by Variation of the egg 
developmental time, T v , from 9.9 to 10.7 days. 
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FIG. 6 (left).—Increasing advantage for vertical migration until an optimal length of the 
night. T n = 0.2, 0.215, . . . , 0.35; ß v = 8. 
FIG. 7 (right).—Decreasing advantage for vertical migration above the optimal length of the 
night. T n = 0.35, 0.38, . . . , 0.65; ß v = 8. 
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egy with increasing frequency of x s (see fig. 3). In a Situation of stable mixtures of 
strategies, a lengthening of the night at first favors the v strategists (fig. 6). 
However, there exists a night length that maximizes the frequency of strategy v. 
Above this optimal value, a prolonged night disfavors vertical migration (fig. 7). 
Even if we ignore the known and unknown correlations between the model 
parameters (e.g., a longer night phase reduces the average temperature of the 
migrating animals and, therefore, increases their egg developmental time), studies 
that alter a Single factor are helpful in understanding the direction and relative 
importance of various selective forces. Accepting the simplifications of the model, 
which probably cause negligible errors compared to the scarcity of available 
experimental information, any particular Situation in the field can be analyzed. 
The aim of the model, however, is directed more to the study of general tenden-
cies and implications. For the same reason, we do not include further analyses of 
much more complicated payoffs that can be calculated, for example, frequency-
dependent predation pressure at low food concentrations. 
DISCUSSION 
In natural populations, the adundance and growth rate of algae, the density of 
Zooplankton, fish predation, day length, water temperature, and also the ampli-
tude of vertical migration change markedly over the seasons of a year. The model, 
however, treats these parameters as constants. Therefore, the model predictions 
describe the selective forces acting in certain fixed environmental settings and in 
distinct periods of the annual cycle. It is plausible that the phenotypes of the two 
strategies can outcompete each other depending on the actual values of factors 
such as the intensity of fish predation. The most important result of this study is 
the existence of stable mixtures of strategies in a large ränge of realistic model 
parameters. This means that there are environmental conditions under which the 
advantage or the disadvantage of migration depends on the relative frequency of 
the strategies in a way that favors the coexistence of migrating and nonmigrating 
phenotypes. Especially under low predation pressure, the observed vertical mi-
gration patterns may be affected by a combination of several factors. The model 
Supports the hypothesis that a change in strength and direction of the selective 
forces induces Variation in the composition of the phenotypes. Clonal replacement 
is therefore an obvious explanation for the Variation in the migration pattern 
during the year. 
However, the model does not exclude the possibility that the migrating pheno-
type includes a change in behavior during the year triggered by external factors (or 
internal clocks). In fact, it does not consider such a Situation. Nevertheless, the 
evolutionary stability of strategy v, depending on various conditions as discussed 
above, may equally well suggest the latter Interpretation. An extended model 
might consider conditional strategies in the sense that finely grained field investi-
gations and experiments would have to be conducted accordingly. Because of the 
difficulty in following Single zooplankters, the available field data on vertical 
migration consider whole populations and not individuals. Therefore, one must be 
carefiil in interpreting the phenomena (see Pearre 1979a,fc). 
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Even such striking results as the Revolution of vertical migration," as observed 
by Gliwicz (1986), can be explained in terms of our model. The existence of stable 
mixtures of strategies with (undetectable) low frequencies of migrating animals (or 
their immigration) would be sufficient to explain the Observation of enhanced 
vertical migration following the increase in fish abundance. The coexistence of the 
migrating and nonmigrating, yet closely related, D a p h n i a species in Lake Con-
stance can be understood without a niche-segregation argument. Slightly different 
metabolic parameters and/or predator-evasion probabilities are sufficient to estab-
lish their different stable strategies. If one treats the two species as one (hybrids 
can be found; Wolf and Mort 1986), then they could be genetically different 
representatives of the two strategies. 
Only two distinct strategies are analyzed in our model. It is very likely, how-
ever, that intermediate strategies are responsible for different migration ampli-
tudes in nature. This could be described by modifications of the model presented 
here; we believe that the level of simplicity chosen here is nevertheless powerful 
enough to obtain the desired interpretation of the ultimate and proximate causes 
of diel vertical migration. Our model is intended to stimulate more detailed 
experiments on the physiology and genetics of Zooplankton. 
SUMMARY 
By applying evolutionary game theory, we calculate the differences in payoffs 
between diel vertical migrating and nonmigrating Zooplankton. The results depend 
on the abundance and growth rate of the algae, the filtration rate and density of the 
Zooplankton, the strategy-dependent efficiency of Converting food into reproduc-
tion, temperature-dependent egg developmental time, day length, and predation 
pressure. In addition to regions where the two strategies exclude each other, it is 
also possible for a population to reach an evolutionarily stable equilibrium mixture 
of strategies. At high food concentrations, equilibrium is unlikely because it would 
require a predation risk increasing with prey abundance; but at low food concen-
trations, strategy mixtures can be stable for many combinations of realistic model 
parameters, even with density-independent mortality caused by fish predation. 
Temporal Variation in the selective forces shifts this equilibrium point. Therefore, 
the model can explain seasonal changes and long-term trends in the pattern of diel 
vertical migration. 
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